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With  the  adoption  of  the  Lisbon  Agenda  in  2000,  the  European  Union  established  for  itself  the
ambitious goal of becoming the most dynamic and competitive economy in the world by 2010. Despite
initial optimism, the first half of the decade has been dispiriting and targets established under the Lisbon
strategy will be difficult to achieve. Many observers have concluded that governments have failed to
implement the policies required to achieve these targets and that, without radical changes, the strategy will
fail to deliver its promises.
Without disagreeing with these conclusions, the present paper argues that they portray the situation
excessively negatively. Using cross-country structural indicators compiled by the OECD, it shows that
changes have occurred during the first half of the Lisbon programme, although not everywhere. The first
part of the paper reviews recent developments in indicators of labour market policies and labour market
performance. It shows that structural policies have moved in the right direction in several countries,
notably tax wedges on labour income for low-wage earners and the implicit tax on continued work. This
has been associated with a somewhat better labour market performance, notably higher employment
rates. As well, the easing of product market regulation, which is deemed to increase the competitive
pressure felt by firms and incite them to invest and innovate, has been associated with faster productivity
growth in some countries and some industries. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of performance across
countries suggests that there is still a large room for countries where reforms are less advanced to adopt
good practices. In these countries, more comprehensive implementation of labour market and product
market reforms is needed to mobilise unused labour resources, put productivity growth on a faster trend
and accelerate the growth of GDP per capita. Based on this overview, the paper raises some political
economy issues related the method of coordination adopted by the Lisbon agenda.
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1
In March 2000, the European Union
2 established for itself the ambitious goal of becoming the most
dynamic  and  competitive  economy  in  the  world  by  2010.  A  variety  of  measurable  targets  were  set
accordingly, from increases in employment to higher spending on research and development. Despite
initial optimism, the first half of the decade has been dispiriting and midterm targets established under the
Lisbon strategy for 2005 will be difficult to achieve. Over the last five years output has moved in fits and
starts, without embarking on a sustained expansion, at a time when other OECD economies, notably the
United States, were enjoying a strong recovery from the post-bubble recession. On the labour market,
high unemployment has persisted in a number of EU countries. As well, trend labour productivity growth
has declined toward the lowest pace ever recorded during the post-war period. Many observers have
concluded that governments have failed to implement the types of policies required to achieve the Lisbon
targets and that, without radical changes, the strategy will fail to deliver its promises
3. 
Without disagreeing with these conclusions, the present paper argues that they portray the situation
excessively negatively. Cross-country indicators show signs of changes occurring during the first half of the
Lisbon programme, even though much remains to be done to catch up with best practice countries. The
lowering of tax wedges on labour income for low-wage earners and the reduction in the implicit tax on
continued work have been associated, for instance, with a somewhat better labour market performance,
notably higher employment rates. As well, the easing of product market regulation, which is deemed to
increase the competitive pressure felt by firms and incite them to invest and innovate, has been associated
with faster productivity growth in some countries and some industries. While this is welcome, more
comprehensive implementation of labour market and product market reforms is needed to mobilise
unused labour resources, put productivity growth on a faster trend and accelerate the growth of GDP per
capita. Recent labour market reforms, such as those recently enacted in Germany under the Agenda 2010
programme, could have a positive impact during the second half of the Lisbon strategy. 
The goal of this paper is to describe changes in structural indicators relevant to the Lisbon strategy. No
attempt is made here at linking changes in structural policy indicators to economic outcomes, an ambition
that would be beyond the scope of this presentation. But the indicators presented in this paper have been
shown to have a significant economic impact in a large body of academic and institutional analyses. The first
part of the paper addresses the Lisbon goal of fostering employment by reviewing recent developments in
indicators of labour market performance and labour market policies. The second part addresses the Lisbon
goal of fostering productivity; rather than covering the many policies that have a bearing on productivity,
the paper focuses on one particular policy area where the European Union has specific interest, namely
the regulatory policies influencing the degree of competition on product markets. The final part takes stock
of this overview and raises some political economy issues related the method of coordination adopted by
the Lisbon agenda. 
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1 The views presented in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as representing official views of the OECD. 
2 In this paper, the European Union refers to the group of 15 countries that constituted the EU before last year’s enlargement. An overall
assessment of the EU25 is not possible at this stage due to the lack of OECD data on new member countries.
3 This includes IMF (2004) and Kok (2004).2. Recent changes on European labour markets 
Fostering the utilisation of potential labour resources is one the main goals of the Lisbon strategy. The
strategy aims at increasing the overall EU employment rate from 64% to 70% by 2010, with sub-targets
for older workers and female workers. Although midterm targets set for 2005 are unlikely to be met, there
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Table 1. Employment rates by groups of workers
1992 1995 2000 2003 2005 2010
European Union
Total employment rate, of which
-- Male workers 72.8 70.5 72.8 72.7 -- --
-- Female workers 49.7 49.7 54.1 56.1 57.0 60.0
-- Older workers (55-64) 36.3 36.0 37.8 41.7 -- 50
United States
Total employment rate, of which 70.8 72.5 74.1 71.2
-- Male workers 78.3 79.5 80.6 76.9
-- Female workers 44.6 47.5 50.6 54.5
-- Older workers (55-64) 53.4 55.1 57.8 59.9
(Share of persons of working age in employment, in per cent)
Lisbon targets
61.2 60.1 63.4 64.4 67 70
Source: EU structural indicator database.are signs that employment trends are slowly changing, as suggested by the increase in the EU employment
rate by 4½ percentage points since the mid-1990s (Chart 1). This increase partly reflects a cyclical bounce-
back from the severe downturn experienced in the first half of the past decade, but there are also signs
that a structural change may be underway. In particular, EU employment was almost unaffected by the
recent slowdown of output, whereas large numbers of jobs were lost during previous downturns, and
unemployment increased only moderately since the last peak of activity (European Commission, 2004a).
This resiliency contrasts with the sharp decline of US employment since 2000, which pushed employment
rates down by over 3 percentage points, as discouraged workers exited from the labour market and young
people prolonged their transition from school to the job market (Table 1). Although a large gap still prevails
between the employment rates of Europe and the United States, this gap may be slowing narrowing.
The fact that a structural change may be occurring can also be seen in the relation between activity and
labour input. Chart 2 shows the relation between real GDP growth and total hours worked during the last
three decades. In the early-1970s, high real GDP annual growth rates of 4% were associated with a trend
decline in hours worked, reflecting the fact that a robust growth of activity did not prevent a decline in
labour input. This relation gradually changed and, since the mid-1990s, real GDP growth of 2% has been
associated with increase in hours worked of about 1% per year. A structural break in the relation between
GDP growth and employment around 1997 was found by recent ECB work (Mourre, 2004). 
While aggregate labour market conditions have changed in the European Union, significant disparity
continues to prevail across countries. The heterogeneity across countries is such that it is preferable to talk
about labour market conditions in individual countries, rather than in the overall European Union. Chart 3
and Table 2 show that some countries have never suffered from prolonged periods of high unemployment,
apart from temporary cyclical peaks (Austria, Denmark, Sweden). Other countries went through long
8
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook databaseperiods of high unemployment, but have been able to establish conditions propitious to job creation and
have brought back unemployment close to 5 per cent (Ireland, United Kingdom, Netherlands). In most of
the  other  countries,  the  combat  against  unemployment  has  been  only  partially  successful  and
unemployment remains high. In France and Germany, in particular, the decline in labour utilisation has not
been reversed as stagnant employment coexists with a shortening of working time.
The persistence of high levels of unemployment has often been associated with the inability of the labour
market to adjust after negative shocks (Blanchard, 2004; Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999; OECD, 2005; Nickell,
1997). In countries where the labour market does not adjust rapidly, temporary spells of unemployment tend
9
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook databaseto persist and result in high levels of long-term unemployment. By contrast, in countries with well-functioning
labour markets, unemployment does not last long, as self-correcting mechanisms, notably lower wage, help to
restore the equilibrium. Long-term unemployment does not exercise the same type of pressure on the wage
level as short-term unemployment because workers with long duration of unemployment tend to lose their
skills and become less employable, and are therefore not seen by insiders as serious competitors. In several
EU countries, notably Germany and Italy, more than 50% of the job-seekers are long-term unemployed (i.e.
registered for one year or more), suggesting poorly-functioning labour markets and overstretched periods of
adjustment. In these countries, the cost of adjustment is likely to be high because insiders will not agree to
negotiate lower wages until unemployment reaches very high levels. In other countries (Denmark, Finland, UK,
Sweden), the share of long-term unemployment is closer to 20%, suggesting a rapid process of adjustment and
well-functioning labour markets. Labour market institutions that encourage a rapid adjustment and a fast return
of the unemployed to the labour market are therefore paramount.
What matters is to find the right balance between the different planks of labour market policies so as
to ease adjustment. This goal can be achieved with different combinations of institutions, depending on
each country’s specific institutional and social norms (OECD, 2004). Thus, labour market institutions can
be either job-friendly or job-unfriendly, depending on the overall context. For instance, without adequate
accompanying  policies,  generous  unemployment  insurance  lowers  the  intensity  of  job  searches  and
therefore tends to increase the average duration of unemployment spells. However, in countries where it
is combined with active job placement policies and low employment protection (such as Denmark and
Netherlands), generous unemployment insurance does not impede the search of new jobs and therefore
does not increase long-term unemployment. Likewise, high taxation of labour has a particularly negative
effect in countries with high minimum wage, which works as a floor on the labour costs for unskilled
workers. Hence, the interaction between different features of the labour market plays an important role.
The following sections review how individual features of labour market policies have recently evolved, but
it is important to keep in mind that their impact is multi-dimensional. 
Taxation of low-wage earners
A particularly important category of labour market reform in recent years has been the reduction in labour
taxation. High taxes increase the cost of labour inasmuch as workers seek to compensate higher levels of
taxes with supplementary wage demands. The effect of labour taxation is particularly large for workers with
few skills and little experience because it drives a wedge between their marginal productivity and the cost of
10
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Table 2. Unemployment rates in EU countries
1970s 1980s 1990s 2004
Luxembourg 0.3 1.4 2.5 4.3
Ireland 7.4 13.9 11.8 4.5
UK 3.3 9.2 7.9 4.7
Netherlands 2.7 7.6 5.6 5.0
Sweden 2.1 2.5 6.2 5.5
Austria 1.3 3.3 5.2 5.5
Denmark 3.0 6.6 6.9 5.8
Portugal 4.9 7.7 5.6 6.7
Belgium 3.4 9.3 8.5 7.8
Italy 4.7 8.4 10.7 8.0
Finland 3.6 4.9 11.9 8.9
Germany 1.4 5.2 7.3 9.3
France 3.9 9.1 11.0 9.8
Spain 3.4 13.8 15.1 10.8
Greece 1.8 6.6 9.5 11.0
Variance 3.05 13.11 10.83 5.54
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.their labour. This is particularly the case when a floor is set on the cost of labour by a statutory minimum
wage. In view of this, government have sought to lower the burden of labour taxation on targeted categories
of workers, notably through cuts in social security contributions and other labour taxes. 
Chart 4 uses indicators of labour taxation compiled to measure the tax burden of typical workers at
various levels of income and in different family situations. As shown, the taxation of low-wage earners
declined between 1998 and 2004 in all EU countries, with more pronounced cuts in Ireland, France and
Belgium. The lower chart examines the progressivity of the tax system measured by the differences
between tax rates at different levels of incomes. In several countries (notably Ireland and France) the tax
11
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The progressivity of the tax wedge differs across countries






















Source: OECD Taxing Wages (2005)
Chart 4. For low-wage earners, the tax wedge has declined 
Income tax plus social security contribution in % of labour costs for single person






















1998 2004rates are significantly lower on low-wage earners than on average or high-wage earners. In the case of
France, however, the cost of unskilled labour is nonetheless the highest in the OECD because a substantial
share of the cuts in labour taxes was used to offset very strong increases in the minimum wage. 
Financial incentives to retire early
Another important reform in labour market policy has related to the participation of older workers. Past
decades  saw  governments  react  to  rising  unemployment  with  measures  meant  to  encourage  the  early
withdrawal  of  older  workers  from  the  labour  force,  notably  through  early-retirement  schemes.    These
schemes, together with traditional features of old-age pension schemes, have been particularly detrimental to
the labour market participation of older workers. Retiring early or at the statutory age of retirement entitles
the older worker to a number of benefits, while continued work implies deferring benefits without necessarily
increasing their levels. The tax and benefit consequences of working beyond the age of retirement have been
evaluated by a new OECD indicator, the “implicit tax on continued work” (Duval, 2003). The indicator takes
into account the net present value of additional contributions paid in case of continued work as well as the
potential increase in pension benefits accrued when workers decide to continue working past the retirement
age. Before recent pension reforms, EU workers aged 55-60 faced implicit taxes of nearly 60% if they decided
not to take advantage of early-retirement and regular old-age pension benefits. Such high rates of taxation
deterred many workers to continue working, severely depressing the employment rates of older workers.
Faced with the prospect of population ageing, several EU governments have reformed their pension
regimes  so  as  to  restore  long-term  financial  sustainability.  These  reforms  often  changed  the  main
parameters of pension benefits as well as the age of entitlement. Together with stricter eligibility to early-
retirement benefits, they have lowered the implicit tax on continued work in several EU countries (e.g.
Germany, France, Belgium), and the average EU15 implicit tax has dropped from about 60% to close to
45% of income (Chart 5). An example of such measure is the reform of the French pension enacted in
2004, which introduces an element of actuarial neutrality in the pension system and lowers the disincentive
to work longer, while increasing the freedom to retire early with a reduced pension. In several countries,
sector-specific early-retirement schemes have been closed, thus reducing the financial disincentive of
continued  work.  This  decline  in  the  implicit  tax  has  been  associated  with  an  increase  the  labour
12
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Chart 5. The implicit tax on continued work has declined
Average of implicit tax on continued work in early retirement route, for 55 and


























































































Source: OECD, Duval (2003).participation of older workers, even though factors other than taxation have probably been at play (notably
the increase in life expectancy).
Stringency of employment legislation
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is a third category of labour market policy that limits the
adaptability  of  labour  markets.  While  such  legislation  is  necessary  to  govern  the  relations  between
employers and employees, excessively strict legislation increases the cost, time and legal complexity of
dismissing workers. By making it more costly and difficult to make workers redundant, EPL limits the
outflows from the labour market, with the negative implication of reducing inflows. Faced with strict EPL,
employers will be more reluctant to hire workers, knowing that it will be difficult to dismiss them. 
Because it reduces both outflows and inflows, strict EPL has ambiguous effects on employment. What
is unambiguous, however, is the asymmetry of effects on various groups of workers. Strict EPL generally
protects insiders, but penalises outsiders. Because it lowers labour market inflows, EPL reduces the re-
employment chances of jobseekers, making for longer unemployment spells. While skilled and experienced
workers are easily employable, they are unlikely to be affected by strict regulation; by contrast, workers
with few skills and little experience are likely to suffer because firms will be hesitant to hire them if they
are difficult to dismiss. The conventional wisdom is therefore that EPL protects employed workers against
the risk of dismissal, but penalises jobseekers. 
13
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The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook: 2004.In view of the importance of EPL, the OECD has built indicators that compare the strictness of
employment  protection  legislation  across  countries.  The  overall  EPL  indicators  combines  three
components  related  to  the  protection  of  regular  workers  against  individual  dismissals,  the  specific
requirements for collective dismissals and the regulation of temporary forms of employment (OECD,
2004). Because these indicators have been compiled with identical methodologies for 1998 and 2003, the
change in EPL strictness over time can be evaluated. As shown by Figure 6, the strictness of EPL governing
regular employment has remained nearly unchanged in the past five years. The cross-country divergence
in EPL strictness that prevailed in 1998 is nearly intact 2003. In several countries (UK, Ireland, Denmark),
firms can dismiss workers without having to deal with a costly and lengthy regulatory process, while in
other countries (France and Southern Europe) strict EPL makes it difficult to fire workers. 
In order to circumvent strict EPL on regular employment, firms may hire workers under temporary
contracts, which are in many countries regulated by less strict rules. Chart 6 shows that EPL on temporary
contracts has been eased more frequently than EPL on regular contracts. As a result of this divergence,
some countries have stricter EPL regimes for regular work than for temporary work. This has been found
to encourage labour market dualism because firms can have recourse to regular and protected contracts
for skilled workers and temporary contracts for the others (OECD, 2004). Although not an optimal
solution, the easing of EPL on temporary workers has helped to foster the creation of temporary jobs; this
might be a reason for the rapid increase in the employment rate of female workers, which are over-
represented in the group of temporary workers, notably in the services sectors and in part-time jobs.
Unemployment insurance
In other policy areas, little change can be seen in structural indicators. For example, little change has
occurred in the level of unemployment benefits. These benefits, while providing a sense of income security,
have the potential to lower search intensity and therefore increase the duration of average unemployment
spells. High levels of income replacement may translate into a rigid wage formation process and therefore
14
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Average of replacement rates for those who earned 67% and 100% of average working earnings.
Source: OECDincrease  the  cost  of  adjustment  in  the  aftermath  of  a  negative  shock.  Chart  7  shows  the  rate  of
replacement income for unemployment in 2002 compared to its previous measure in 1999. The figure
illustrates the great heterogeneity of unemployment insurance policies, with replacement rates ranging
from 50% of previous earnings (UK) to nearly 90% (Sweden). Notwithstanding existing evidence that
generous benefits encourage longer spells of unemployment and reduce labour market adaptability, few
EU governments have attempted to reform them. Little has been done in the most generous countries to
cut these entitlements. 
The absence of reforms in this area might be explained by the social cost that they would entail, at least
in  the  short-term,  as  the  replacement  income  of  jobseekers  would  fall  immediately,  while  structural
changes in employment trends would take time to appear. This is perhaps why countries have emphasised
job placement policies, such as the recent measures under the German Agenda 2010 plan, which limits the
duration of unemployment benefits and lower their level, while at the same time increase the resources
available for personalised job search assistance.
To summarise, a change in employment trends seems to have occurred in Europe, not only thanks to
the cyclical rebound of the late 1990s but also to a more fundamental improvement. Yet, a large degree of
heterogeneity  prevails  across  countries,  with  some  countries  having  achieved  sharply  lower
unemployment,  while  others  still  experience  two-digit  unemployment  rates.  Where  employment  has
improved, this seems to have resulted from a combination of changes in policies that made the labour
market function in a more effective manner. In high-unemployment countries, structural reforms have
either  been  insufficiently  ambitious,  combined  in  a  suboptimal  way  or  implemented  too  recently  to
produce significant effects. There is therefore wide agreement that labour market reforms need to be
implemented in a comprehensive and coherent way (European Commission, 2005). The way to achieve
this  policy  coherence  depends  on  country  circumstances  and  institutions  (OECD,  2004).  Given  the
country-specific nature of labour market reforms, there is little room for having a unique and centralised
approach at the EU level. This has implications for the Lisbon Strategy, which are further discussed below.
3. Productivity and product market competition
Increasing productivity growth is another important goal of the Lisbon strategy. The Lisbon programme
aims at making Europe the most dynamic economy in the world, a goal that cannot be achieved without
dynamic trends in labour productivity. Despite the importance of this goal, Figure 8 shows that the trend
of hourly productivity has fallen in recent years, preventing the European Union from gathering speed.
Hourly labour productivity growth has barely exceeded 1% annually in the European Union during 2000-
2004, sharply less than the pace of 2% to 2½% recorded in the United States. Hence, the productivity
gap between the two regions is widening.
This widening of the productivity gap stems from two changes in opposite directions. In the United
States, productivity accelerated in the mid-1990s, a development that has often been attributed to the
diffusion of new information and communication technologies and the associated surge in business fixed
investment.  In  Europe,  by  contrast,  the  diffusion  of  the  same  new  technologies  did  not  increase
productivity growth. In fact, EU productivity slowed after the mid-1990s. While some sectors benefited
from the use of ICT technologies (notably telecommunication), a majority of other industries saw their
productivity growth decline significantly (O’Mahony and Van Ark, 2004). The fact that the acceleration in
15
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was more than a simple cyclical phenomenon. A fundamental change seems to have occurred.
Within the EU, productivity growth differs across countries. A few economies have achieved levels of
productivity growth similar to that of the US (Ireland, Sweden, UK), while in other countries productivity
nearly came to a standstill (Spain and Italy). This variety of experience suggests that policy settings have
influenced productivity outcomes. Although governments do not influence productivity directly, a variety of
structural policies have an indirect influence on it, including policies related to education, innovation and
investment. Likewise, the type of labour market reforms discussed in the first part of this paper may exert
a temporary drag on productivity insofar as low-productivity workers are reabsorbed into the labour force. 
In addition, there is growing evidence that the degree of competition in product markets has an important
influence on productivity (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; European Commission, 2004b). A high degree of
16
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There is a large disparity of productivity growth rates across countries























Chart 8. EU hourly labour productivity growth has fallen below the US level
                                    Labour productivity per hour
(Real GDP divided by total hours worked; annual growth, moving average





















USA EUcompetition plays a key role in influencing firms’ incentives to seek efficiency gains either via the adoption of
technological and organisational best practices, so as to use production factors more effectively. A high level
of competition also encourages firms to innovate and move closer to the technology frontier. Combined with
labour market reform, a greater degree of product market competition reduces the level of mark-ups and
lowers the bargaining position of insiders, with beneficial impact on employment trends. In addition, relatively
“liberal” regulatory policies are often associated with easy employment protection legislation. 
Product market regulation indicators, compiled by the OECD for 1998 and 2003, measure the change
in the setting of policies influencing competition (Conway et al, 2005). These indicators were developed
to describe broad differences in product market policies across OECD countries. They seek to evaluate
the regulations that have the potential to reduce the intensity of competition in areas of the product
market where technology and market conditions make competition viable. The structure of indicators,
which are based on questionnaires sent to OECD governments, takes the form of pyramid with 16 detailed
indicators at the base that are aggregated successively to produce indicators in three domains (state
control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment) that are summarised in one
product market regulation indicator at the top. Thus, detailed aspects about regulatory practices (such as
licensing requirements or trade tariffs) are combined with industry-specific regulations (such as rules
governing retail trade) to produce an overall assessment of the regulatory stance. The production of the
indicator uses a variety of verifications, for instance to ascertain the quality of answers to the questionnaires
or to test different weights used in the aggregation. Nonetheless the indicators remain largely confined to
formal regulatory policy requirements and do not directly take into account informal regulatory practices
or the strictness of implementation of these requirements.
The indicators, which were initially produced for 1998, have been recently updated for 2003 with the
objective of ensuring full comparability between the two observations. Between these two dates, the
regulatory stance of all OECD member countries has been eased significantly (Chart 9). State controls have
been lowered, price controls have been lifted, state ownership of enterprises has been reduced, barriers
to entry have been removed, trade barriers have been eliminated and countries have become more open
to foreign direct investment. In Europe, the implementation of single market directives has helped to boost
17
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The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive.
Source: Conway et al. (2005).cross-border competitive pressures, especially in the market of goods. Other European initiatives to foster
competition is various sectors, such as telecommunications and air transport, have also helped to increase
competitive pressures, notably by allowing the entry of new players. If the past relationship between pro-
competition policies and productivity growth continues to prevail, some acceleration of productivity could
occur in the second half of the decade in countries that have undertaken the greatest liberalisation efforts.
Nonetheless, the indicators show that important differences continue to prevail across EU member
states, despite the adoption of EU directives on the functioning of the single market and competition policy.
The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have adopted pro-competition policies, while other member
states have stricter regulatory stances. This large variance is possible because many policy areas related to
competition do not belong to the prerogatives of the European Commission, such as the extent of state
ownership, which remains a policy issue in the hands of national policymakers. In addition, some member
states do not transpose EU Directives in full, or transpose them late. Overall, product market competition
has become more intense in the EU, but much remains to be done to open a number of markets to
competition and remove existing barriers.
4. How to reinvigorate the Lisbon Strategy?
Initially adopted to promote growth in Europe, the Lisbon Strategy is often viewed as a symbol of
Europe’s  inability  to  improve  its  economic  performance.  As  argued  in  this  paper,  this  assessment  is
undeservedly negative. While EU-wide performance has indeed been dispiriting in many respects, there
are a number of areas where changes in slowly occurring. Employment trends appear to be improving at
the aggregate EU level, and most particularly in some countries, and the large gap in labour utilisation
between the US and the EU has slightly declined. EU-wide productivity growth has decelerated, but there
are a few countries that have recorded a pace of productivity similar to that of the US. Where employment
and productivity trends have improved, this appears to have been associated with the implementation of
structural reforms. 
Despite this initial improvement, progress has been limited and much remains to be done to close the
gap with best practice countries in the OECD. This does not mean that the Lisbon Strategy should be
abandoned.  Its  framework  is  sound  and  it  appropriately  aims  at  fostering  growth,  through  higher
employment and faster productivity. But the implementation of policies by member states has fallen short
of expectations. This raises the question of how the Lisbon Strategy could stimulate a more proactive
implementation of structural reforms. At present, the strategy relies on the “open method of coordination”
to encourage the implementation of reforms in member countries. The method combines the utilisation
of benchmarking exercises, which assess the performance of each country against a set of numerical
targets, and regular peer review sessions, which are deemed to encourage less-performing countries to
accelerate  their  reforms.  Besides  these  informal  arrangements,  there  is  little  that  the  EU  can  do  to
stimulate reforms in member countries, given the lack of legal instruments in most areas. 
This is particularly the case in the labour market area, which impinge on policies that are largely within
the prerogatives of national governments. The EU has established a framework to co-ordinate employment
policies, under the European Employment Strategy, which encompasses the Employment Guidelines, the
Council  Recommendations  to  member  states  on  employment  policies,  the  National  Actions  Plans  on
employment policies, and the Joint Employment Report. While this framework aims at co-ordinating the
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largely based on national objectives, rather that being guided by the EU (Alesina and Perotti, 2004). 
Hence, there is support for maintaining a large degree of decentralisation in labour market reforms
(Boeri, 2004). As noted, the goal of making labour markets function better can be reached in different
ways,  and  notably  with  different  combinations  of  policies,  depending  on  country  circumstances  and
institutions. What seems to matter is to achieve coherence in the setting of the various instruments, so as
to obtain maximum synergies. Given the various interactions between instruments and the country-specific
features, the bulk of decision-making needs to remain at the national level. 
Based on past experience, EU policy initiatives are successful when they produce a common good. For
instance, they have been successful in removing intra-EU customs barriers, because this produced a
common good with obvious benefits, notably lower prices for consumers and easier market entry for
firms. Similarly, the process of monetary union, the launching of the euro and the establishment of the ECB
have had positive externalities associated with lower transaction costs, exchange rate stability and low
inflation in all member countries. 
Given this backdrop, the Lisbon Strategy might be more successful if refocused on areas where a common
good could be produced. Fostering product market competition, notably in the services sector, is a good
candidate in this respect. The benefits of enhancing competition within Europe should be obvious to all,
including to consumers benefiting from lower prices, to firms taking opportunity of lower barriers to entry
and to workers finding jobs in deregulated sectors. The spill-over effects of enhanced competition could be
particularly important in the euro area: increased competition could translate into faster productivity and
increased potential growth, making faster pace of activity possible without rekindling inflationary pressure. 
In view of the large externalities that could be obtained, it would seem appropriate to refocus the
Lisbon Strategy on the objective of enhancing product market competition. Completing the single market,
notably in the services sector, seems a good candidate for a reformulated and more focused Lisbon policy
agenda. By putting this goal at the centre of the Lisbon Strategy, Europe would get a greater chance to
become a very competitive and dynamic region by 2010.
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